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ARTICLES

STANLEY SIEGEL*

The Effects of Tax Laws on the Choice
of Organizational Form and Structure:
A Comparison of Integrated and
Nonintegrated Tax Systems**
I. Taxation of Corporations, Partnerships, and

Limited Liability Companies
The choice of form for a business involves complex and often conflicting
questions of economics, law, and taxation. For example, the simplicity and flexibility of the partnership are offset by the problems of partners' exposure to
personal liability for business debts. Conversely, the corporate shareholders'

immunity from exposure to business liability comes at the expense of a more
complex and structured legal organization. In the U.S. legal systems (federal
and state) both the problems and virtues of these forms may be heavily modified
by structural arrangements made by the parties.
Note: The American Bar Association grants permission to reproduce this article, or a part thereof,
in any not-for-profit publication or handout provided such material acknowledges original publication
in this issue of The InternationalLawyer and includes the title of the article and the name of the
author.
*Professor of Law, New York University Law School.
**This article is a summary of a presentation made in January 1994 at a symposium on The Effects
of Tax Laws on the Choice of Organizational Form and Structure in the United States and Italy,
sponsored by the University of Rome, La Sapienza. A version of the article will be simultaneously
published, together with the other symposium papers, in the Review of InternationalTaxation of the
University of Rome, La Sapienza.

2

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

To these inherent economic and legal difficulties of choice of organizational
form must be added the differences in tax treatment between partnerships and
their partners, on the one hand, and corporations and their shareholders, on the
other. In the United States, where separate taxation of corporations and shareholders remains firmly imbedded in the law, these differences are so great as in many
instances to dictate the choice of form. By contrast, in nations where the
income tax systems of corporations and individuals are integrated in any form
or degree, the differences in tax treatment may be reduced, but are unlikely to
be eliminated. 1
This article analyzes these issues primarily from the viewpoint of the noncorporate investor faced with the choice of structuring an investment in the United
States as a corporation or a noncorporate entity. Different and equally significant
issues are presented when these choices must be made by a corporate investor.
A.

CORPORATIONS ARE TAXED AS SEPARATE TAXABLE ENTITIES

Corporations are, within the structure of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
separate taxable entities. 2 Corporations are taxed, at a maximum rate of 35 percent, 3 on a basis largely consistent with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, with some important exceptions and limitations. Ordinary and necessary
business expenses, such as cost of goods sold,4 salaries,5 and interest on debt, 6
are deductible in determining taxable income. Dividends, whether in cash, other
assets, stock, or securities, are not deductible. No credit or other tax allowance
is allowed to the corporation with respect to dividend distribution.
Individuals who receive corporate dividends must report the amount thereof
for tax purposes just as they report all other ordinary taxable income. 7 Accordingly, the dividends received are taxed at progressive rates, up to a maximum
rate of 39.6 percent for the 1993 tax year.'
1. Many of the important trading nations of the world have adopted so-called integrated incometax systems, in which the double-tax effects described below are mitigated by any of a variety of
mechanisms. The systems of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom are described and analyzed in UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION
OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS

159-184 (1992) [hereinafter the TREASURY

INTE-

GRATION REPORT].

2. Internal Revenue Code § 11(a) (1986, as amended) [hereinafter I.R.C.].
3. I.R.C. § 11(b). The applicable tax rates vary from 15% (taxable income $50,000 or less)
to 35 % (taxable income in excess of $10 million). For determination of income and deductions, see
generally I.R.C. §§ 61(a), 161-196.
4. See I.R.C. §§ 64, 162(a).
5. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1). But see I.R.C. § 162(m) (disallowance of deduction for excessive employee remuneration).
6. I. R. C. § 163(a). The exceptions to the general rule of deductibility of interest are not discussed
here.
7. I.R.C. § 61(a)(7). For the definition of "dividend," see I.R.C. § 316.
8. I.R.C. § 1. The rates, which vary based on taxable income, apply to different income brackets
for individuals, married couples filing joint income tax returns, and heads-of-households. For the
tax year 1993, the rate brackets for married couples filing jointly were as follows:
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The combined effect of the corporate and individual income taxes is that the
effective tax rate on distributed corporate income is 60.74 percent, assuming
maximum tax rates, leaving only 39.26 percent net income after federal taxes. 9
A limited exception to double taxation once existed in the federal tax structure
under the General Utilities'° doctrine: properly structured sales of appreciated
assets as part of a plan of corporate liquidation could escape gains taxation at
the corporate level. 1 Also, certain direct (in kind) distributions of corporate
assets could be made without taxation of the gain thereon to the corporation. 2
This exception no longer exists: sales or distributions of appreciated corporate
assets, whether or not in pursuance of a plan of liquidation, will3 give rise to
recognition of gain by both the corporation and its shareholders.'
Despite the repeal of the General Utilitiesdoctrine, other methods for avoidance
or deferral of double taxation remain available. These methods include debt
financing, salary payments, corporate entity dispositions and corporate reorganizations, and stock retention until death.
The federal income tax structure is mirrored in many, though not all, state
income tax laws. Corporations are subject to an additional state income tax in
most of the states in which they do business, the allocation of income among
the states being subject to a variety of formulas. Further, most states impose
upon their individual residents a personal income tax, which includes within its
base of taxable income dividends received from corporations. This additional
layer of state taxation significantly increases the effective double-tax burden on
distributed corporate income, despite the fact that the state income taxes paid

Up to $36,900
15.0%
$36,901-$89,150
28.0%
$89,151-$140,000
31.0%
$140,001-$250,000
36.0%
In excess of $250,000
39.6%
9. The 60.74% tax rate is calculated as follows:
Net corporate income before tax
100.00%
Corporate tax (35% tax rate)
35.00
Amount distributed to stockholders
65.00%
Individual tax (39.6% tax rate)
25.74
Net stockholder income after taxes
39.26%
Total corporate & individual tax
60.74%
10. General Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
11. See I.R.C. § 336(a) as in effect prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
12. See I.R.C. § 311(a)(2) as in effect prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The recipient
shareholders, however, recognized gain equal to the fair market value of the distributed assets less
their basis in the stock given up (if the distribution qualified as a redemption), or alternatively
recognized ordinary dividend income in an amount equal to the fair market value of the distributed
assets. See I.R.C. §§ 301-302.
13. I.R.C. § 31 l(b)(1) (gain recognized by corporation on nonliquidating distribution of appreciated assets; I.R.C. § 336(a) (gain recognized by corporation on distribution in liquidation of appreciated assets); I.R.C. § 302(a) (gain or loss recognized by stockholder on redemption of stock); I.R.C.
§ 331 (gain or loss recognized by stockholder on complete liquidation of corporation).
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are deductible in calculating the federal taxable income of both the corporation
and its shareholders. 4 For example, if the state income tax rate is 10 percent
on both corporate and individual income, the total income tax on distributed
corporate income would be 68.2
percent, leaving less than one-third of the net
5
income available after taxes.'

B.

PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
PAY

No

INCOME TAXES

Like corporations, partnerships must file federal income tax returns. However,
partnerships pay no federal or state income taxes. Instead, their partners are
treated as though they directly earn and incur their allocable share of each of
the items of partnership income and expense. The most direct implications of
this structure are that partnership income is taxed only at the partner level, 16 and
is taxed when it is8 earned by the partnership, 7 not when the income is distributed
to the partners.
One important effect of this tax structure is that distributed partnership income
is taxed only once. For ordinary partnership income, the effective maximum tax
rate is therefore 39.6 percent, a savings of more than 21 percent over the combined
corporate and individual taxes for distributed corporate income. Moreover, since
partnership income, gains, expenses, and losses retain their character in the hands
of the partners, the tax on capital gains (as, for example, on sale of land or other
capital or productive assets) is only 28 percent.' 9
An equally important effect of this tax structure is that gains on sales of partnership assets made in the course of partnership liquidation are similarly taxed only
once. Moreover, if in liquidation the partnership distributes assets in kind (i.e.,
without sale), gain is ordinarily not realized by the recipient partners, who simply
14. I.R.C. § 164(a)(1).
15. The 68.2% tax rate is calculated as follows:
Net corporate income before tax
100.00%
State corporate income tax (10% rate)
10.00
Net income subject to federal tax
90.00%
Federal corporate income tax (35 % rate)
31.50
Amount distributed to stockholders
58.50%
State personal income tax (10% rate)
5.85%
Net income subject to federal tax
52.65%
Federal personal income tax (39.6% rate)
20.85
Net stockholder income after taxes
31.80%
Total corporate & individual tax
68.20%
16. I.R.C. §§ 701, 702.
17. I.R.C. § 706(a).
18. I.R.C. § 731(a)(1).
19. By contrast, capital gains of a corporation (including partnership capital gains allocated to
a corporate partner) are taxed at the same rate as ordinary income. I.R.C. § 1201. Corporate stockholders are therefore not only effectively subject to a double tax, but may be taxed at higher rates as
well.
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take the assets with a carryover basis.2 °This arrangement, unavailable in corporate
form, allows any gain or loss on the distributed assets to be deferred until the
time when the recipient partners decide to dispose of those assets.
A further potential tax virtue of partnership form is that the losses as well as
the profits of a partnership are passed through to the partners." Depending upon
the character of the losses and the nature of the partners' participation in the
partnership, there may, however, be limits imposed on the use of these losses.22
The pass-through of items of partnership income, gain, expense, and loss may
be allocated and distributed according to detailed provisions of the partnership
agreement. Although these allocation and distribution provisions will generally
be respected for tax purposes, the provisions offer considerable potential for
tax shifting and avoidance, and therefore are subject to extensive and detailed
regulations.23
These tax virtues are not entirely without cost. As noted earlier, the allocable
shares of partnership income and loss are reportable by the partners as earned
or incurred, regardless of whether distribution has taken place.2 4 As a result, a
partnership may need to make periodic distributions of income to provide the
partners with the necessary funds to pay the taxes for which they are liable.
However, the maximum ordinary tax rate is, at this writing, 39.6 percent for
noncorporate partners, as compared with the 35 percent maximum corporate
income tax rate. Thus, periodic distributions of the amounts needed to pay taxes
would not substantially exceed the taxes that would otherwise be payable in
corporate form. And no further tax would be payable by the partners upon distribution from the partnership.
Partnership form involves other complexities of tax qualification, recordkeeping, and filing. Other potentially problematical aspects of partnership form,
such as personal liability of partners for debts of the partnership, are not taxrelated. Appropriate planning can mitigate some of these problems as well.
C.

THE RESULTING TAX STRUCTURE CREATES AN INCENTIVE TO USE
PARTNERSHIP FoRm

IN THE UNITED STATES WHEN FEASIBLE

The difference between the effective tax rate imposed on income earned and
distributed by a corporation and the effective tax rate imposed on income earned
and distributed by a partnership is too great to ignore. The disparity creates a
20. I.R.C. § 731 (no recognition of gain or loss); I.R.C. § 732 (carryover of basis).
21. I.R.C. § 704.

22. A partner may take losses only to the extent of the basis in the partnership interest. I.R.C.
§ 704(d). Complex rules govern basis of the partner in the partnership, including a limitation that
basis for loss purposes generally excludes amounts not considered "at risk" in the business. I.R.C.
§ 465. Further, the Code contains elaborate rules limiting the extent to which an individual may
utilize "passive activity losses," including those arising from a partnership. I.R.C. § 469.
23. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (1986).
24. I.R.C. § 706(a).
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strong incentive to use the partnership form whenever feasible. The partnership
form is extensively and almost exclusively used for forms of business enterprise
that expect primarily to distribute rather than reinvest earnings. Similarly, partnership is the preferred form for enterprises that have limited planned life, that are
expected to be sold or liquidated in the short term. Thus, the partnership form
is now used in the United States for most real estate businesses (for example,
commercial and residential rental buildings, shopping centers, and real estate
development companies), natural resource exploration Ventures (such as oil and
gas exploration), motion picture productions, and personal service enterprises.
Problems in adopting the structures of the classic partnership form to the
economic needs of the parties have resulted in substantial legal development of
U.S. partnership law in the last few decades. Personal liability is readily avoided
by use of the limited partnership form of business, but American limited partnership law traditionally precluded limited partners from participating in the control
of the business, relegating them to the role of purely passive investors.25 The
revision of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act in 1976 and thereafter addressed
this problem and others by greatly extending the permissible participation by
limited partners in control and operation of the business and significantly increasing their protection against firm debts.2 6 The requirement that at least one partner
of the limited partnership be a general partner who is unlimitedly liable for the
partnership debts is now routinely addressed by naming a corporation as the
general partner.27 This device is not forbidden by either the corporate or the
partnership laws.28
More complex questions are raised as the number of investors in the partnership
increases. Nothing in the substantive law of general or limited partnerships limits
the number of partners that may be admitted. However, maintenance of the
required accounting records, especially the tax accounting records, of partner25. The structural law of business associations-corporations, partnerships, limited partnerships,
limited liability companies, and other forms-is found in state statutes. Although the form, content,
and drafting of corporate laws varies widely among the states, partnership law has been essentially
uniform throughout the 20th century. The general law of partnerships is governed by the Uniform
Partnership Act, which has been adopted in all but one state. The law of limited partnerships is
governed by the Uniform Limited Partnership Act which, prior to its revision, was in effect in all
the states. The original Uniform Limited Partnership Act prohibited participation by limited partners
in the control of the business; their participation rendered them fully liable for debts as general
partners.
26. See REV. UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303, 6 U.L.A. 441 (Supp 1994) [hereinafter
RULPA]. The RULPA, occasionally with variations, has been adopted in nearly all of the states as
of this writing.
27. The requirement that there be a general partner appears in several sections of the Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act. See RULPA §§ 101(7), 201(3), 801(4).
28. See RULPA §§ 101(5), 101(11) (corporation as general partner); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
CoRP. ACT § 3.02(9) (1984) (corporate power to act as a partner). The Internal Revenue Service
requires, as a condition of ruling in favor of partnership status, that the corporate general partner
satisfy certain minimum requirements of capitalization and ownership. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 89-1
C.B. 798; Rev. Proc. 92-88, 1992-42 I.R.B. 39.
VOL. 29, NO. 1
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ships with many partners can become quite complex, 29 particularly if partners
withdraw or new partners join during the year. Despite these problems, several
large-scale limited partnerships provide for public trading of their partnership
interests or depositary receipts. 3°
These features of partnership law and partnership drafting have often made
the resulting enterprise look very much like a corporation. This resemblance has
not escaped the attention of the Internal Revenue Service. The Internal Revenue
Code grants authority to the Commissioner to characterize enterprises in accordance with their substance, and in the widely cited decision of Larsonv. Commissioner3 the United States Tax Court set forth the criteria for determining that
characterization. Larson holds that the presence of a majority (i.e., three) of the
following factors will result in characterization as a corporation for tax purposes:
(1) limitation of liability, (2) continuity of life, (3) centralized management, and
(4) free transferability of interests.
General partnerships formed in the United States will invariably be treated as
partnerships for tax purposes, since they will ordinarily have none of the listed
criteria. Limited partnerships, however, will often meet several of the criteria
for taxation as a corporation. Most will have centralized management, and many,
by virtue of having a corporate general partner, will be treated as having limitation
of liability. The terms of some limited partnership agreements may establish
freely transferable interests. Therefore, careful planning and drafting of limited
partnership agreements are necessary to assure that no more than two of these
criteria are met and thereby to assure taxation as a partnership.
In an attempt to achieve the tax virtues of partnership form while more closely
approximating the character of a corporation, many states enacted legislation
authorizing the formation of a new form of organization, the limited liability
company. The first limited liability company statute in the United States was
enacted in 1977 in Wyoming. 32 At least thirty-six other states have enacted similar
statutes since then, and limited liability legislation is pending in many of the
remaining states. A committee of the American Bar Association drafted a prototype limited liability company act, and the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws is currently completing work on a Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act. 3
29. The Treasury Regulations require that capital accounts be maintained for each partner, and
that ultimate allocations and distributions be in accordance with these capital accounts. See the
"substantial economic effect" requirement of Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1986). For each partner,
the partnership must file with its annual federal income tax return a Form K-i, detailing that partner's
allocable share of items of income, gain, expense, and loss for the year.
30. However, with some exceptions, publicly traded partnerships are treated as corporations for
tax purposes. See I.R.C. § 7704 and the discussion below.
31. 66 T.C. 159 (1976).
32. See Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -136 (1977).
33. The contemporary limited liability company has early antecedents in the United States. These
include the Pennsylvania partnership association, created in 1874, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § § 341-361
(repealed 1970); the Michigan partnership association, created in 1877, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
SPRING 1995
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The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that these limited liability companies
will be treated for tax purposes as partnerships if they, like limited partnerships,

do not meet a majority of the Larson criteria.3 4 The limited liability company
statutes generally provide sufficient flexibility that the entity may be structured

to be treated either as a corporation or as a partnership for tax purposes.
Nevertheless, the combined effect of the Larsoncriteria and the practical limitations on the use of the partnership or limited liability company is that continuing

business enterprises with many owners, and in particular those with transferable
share interests, will usually remain in corporate form, despite the tax disadvantages thereof.35
II. Tax Incentives to Issue Debt Rather than Stock

A.

THE INCOME TAX EFFECTS OF THE RECEIPT OF DIVIDENDS OR OF
INTEREST ARE BASICALLY EQUIVALENT

For individual investors, both dividends on corporate stock and interest on
corporate bonds are taxable as ordinary income.3 6 The tax equivalence of dividends and interest is independent of the fixed, variable, contingent, or participat-

ing character of the payments. Moreover, gains and losses on the purchase and
sale of stocks and bonds are taxed comparably, generally as capital gains and
losses subject to a favorable lower tax rate. 37 Therefore, the investment choice
between stocks and bonds will normally be governed by economic, financial,
and legal considerations such as risk, security, return rate, liquidation rights,
and voting, having no relationship to taxation.

The tax equivalence of these investments generally remains for institutional
investors, such as mutual funds, insurance companies, pension funds, and certain

trusts. For some of these investors, both forms of income, as well as gains
and
38
losses on sale of stocks and bonds, are exempt from income taxation.
§§

449.301-.373 (West 1989); and the New Jersey and Ohio limited partnership associations, N.J.
§§ 342:31-29 (West 1992), OHfo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1783.01-.08 (Baldwin 1992),
created in 1880 and 1881, respectively.
34. The first favorable ruling was with respect to the Wyoming limited liability company, Rev.
Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. Since then, numerous published and private rulings have been issued,
each with reference to a particular statute.
35. Mitigation of the shareholder-level tax burden of corporations may be (and often is) achieved
through a combination of minimum dividend distributions, tax-free mergers, other corporate reorganizations, and retention of stock until death. Detailed discussion of the implementation of these arrangements is beyond the scope of this paper, but their effect in brief is the avoidance of gain taxation
despite change in the character of the investment and (in the case of death) transmission of the stock
to heirs with increased tax basis.
36. I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (interest); I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (dividends).
37. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (28% maximum rate).
38. For example, pension trusts qualified under I.R.C. § 401(a) are exempt from taxation under
I.R.C. § 501(a). Also exempt from taxation under § 501(a) are organizations described in § 501(c),
including charities and foundations. These pension trusts and nonprofit organizations are among the
important institutional investors, accounting for a substantial part of the investment in publicly traded
stocks and bonds in the United States.
STAT. ANN.
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While gains or losses on the sale of stock or bonds are generally treated equivalently as capital gains or losses, this equivalent treatment is not extended to
redemption, repurchase, or repayment by the issuing corporation. Payment or
purchase of a bond by the issuing corporation in whatever form is treated by all
bondholders as repayment of the debt principal. The resulting gain or loss, if
any, is recognized only to the extent that the payment is greater or less than the
bondholder's basis in the bond. 39 Equivalent tax treatment is given to corporate
stock repurchase, but only when the repurchase meets statutory standards qualifying it as a redemption 4° or partial liquidation. When the repurchase does not
meet these standards, it will be subject to dividend taxation on the entire amount
received in the distribution. 42
These rules apply equally to corporate investors, with one important exception.
Dividends paid by one corporation to another corporation that are otherwise
taxable are normally subject to partial or full deduction from income.43 This
deduction avoids triple or further multiple tax on the distributed income of corporations that are, in turn, owned by other corporations.
The overall effect of these rules on investors is that, with some exceptions,
the tax effects of receiving income on stock or bonds will be equivalent. The
tax effects of disposition of the investment will generally also be equivalent,
except when corporate redemption is treated as equivalent to a dividend.
B.

CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION EFFECTS OF DIVIDEND PAYMENT AND
INTEREST PAYMENT ARE DIFFERENT

Equivalent tax treatment does not extend to the corporation that issues the
stock or debt instruments. Dividends on corporate stock, in whatever form and
however determined, are not deducted in determining corporate taxable income
or credited in calculating income taxes payable. By contrast, interest on corporate
debt is normally fully deductible in calculating corporate taxable income.
The effects of this tax difference on the cost of raising capital in various forms
are obvious and readily calculable. For example, in today's market the market
dividend rate on the preferred stock of a well rated corporation would likely be
in the range of perhaps 10 percent to 12 percent per year. The same corporation
should be able to issue medium or long-term bonds carrying an annual interest
rate in the range of 8 percent or less. Since the interest is deductible, the taxes
of the corporation will be reduced by 35 percent of the interest payment, or 2.8
percent. As a result, the true interest cost, in both expense and cash flow, will
be 5.2 percent.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See I.R.C. § 1221 (defining capital assets).
See I.R.C. § 302(b)(1)-(b)(3).
See I.R.C. § 302(b)(4).
I.R.C. § 301(a).
See I.R.C. §§ 243-247 for rules on the dividend received deduction.
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As a matter of basic corporate finance, the cost of raising capital by issuance
of stock should be, and nearly always is, greater than the cost of raising capital
by issuance of debt since the higher risk of stock requires a higher return. In the
U.S. tax system, this already present difference is amplified by the deductibility of
interest versus the nondeductibility of dividends.
As might be expected, this tax structure creates incentives to issue more debt
than might otherwise be issued in a system in which dividends and interest were
treated equivalently. Debt issuance is affected by these tax incentives, and the
incentive to issue corporate debt increases as corporate tax rates increase.
Given the corporate tax advantages of debt, some corporations have issued
equity-like instruments that purport to be debt for tax purposes. Other corporations
have created capital structures in which shareholders own debt in proportion to
their equity, with the object of providing additional tax deductions to the corporation. Indeed, an entire tax jurisprudence has developed around the issue of distinguishing debt from equity." For purposes of this article, it is sufficient to suggest
that while true debt is clearly entitled to the tax advantage of deductibility of
interest, debt of mixed character and excessive or proportionately owned debt
will be questioned by the Internal Revenue Service.
C.

SUBSTANTIAL DEBT ISSUANCE CHANGES THE CHARACTER OF
CORPORATE SECURITIES

The tax incentive to form a partnership (when it is feasible) instead of a corporation appears to have had little effect on the U.S. economy, apart from directing
some business to lawyers and accountants specializing in tax law. The corporate
incentive to issue debt in preference to equity is another story. As the proportion
of debt in the capital structure of a corporation increases, the risk of both the
debt and the equity increases; and, indeed, the likelihood of bankruptcy or lesser
financial distress based on inability to meet debt service requirements also increases.
The theory that the corporation's shareholders would be motivated to limit the
amount of debt because the value of their shares would decline with increased
risk has recently been questioned. The stock of corporations with very substantial
debt is, in theory, more akin to an option than to a pure equity interest. The
holders of the corporate debt are entitled to be paid only out of the corporate
assets, and they bear the risk that those assets will be insufficient to pay the entire
debt. If the corporation's assets are insufficient to pay its debts, the shareholders
simply walk away from their investments. By contrast, if the corporation's assets
are sufficient to pay its debts, the shareholders own the entire remaining value
in excess of the debt. The shareholders are therefore, in economic terms, in the
44. See I.R.C. § 385 (delegation of authority to the Internal Revenue Service to recharacterize
debt or equity instruments in accordance with their substance; listing of criteria).
VOL. 29, NO. 1
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position of holders of a call option. 45 Contemporary option theory suggests that

the value of such stock may increase with increased risk. 46 In effect, the shareholders may have an incentive to increase, rather than limit, the amount of corporate
debt. This analysis suggests that the U.S. tax incentives may be promoting an
excessive and unhealthy expansion of debt. This argument is not without controversy and remains to be definitively explored by empirical study.

M. The Effects of Tax Integration
A.

INTEGRATION PROPOSALS FOR THE U.S. INCOME TAX SYSTEM

Tax integration is a broad concept, encompassing a variety of structures designed to approximate a single, integrated tax on corporate income. Integration
of individual and corporate income has been studied47 and implemented in a
variety of forms48 in many of the developed nations of the world. In the United
States, the subject has also been widely studied, 49 and debate has most recently
focused on two proposals.
The Treasury Department has proposed a dividend exclusion approach as a

short-term measure and a comprehensive business income tax as a long-range
goal.'° In its basic structure, a dividend exclusion model calls for corporate income

45. See J. WESTON & T.

COPELAND, MANAGERIAL FINANCE

500-02 (8th ed. 1989).

46. One of the surprising implications of considering equity in a levered firm as a call
option is that investments which increase the idiosyncratic, or diversifiable, risk of
a firm without changing its expected return will benefit shareholders at the expense
of bondholders even though the value of the firm is unaffected ....
The reason is
that higher variance [in returns] will increase the value of the call option held by
shareholders.
Id. at 502.
A similar result may be achieved by increasing the risk of the stock through increasing the proportion
of debt financing of the firm: the increased risk of the stock increases its value as a call option.
47. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON COMPANY TAXATION

(1992) [hereinafter Ruding Committee Report]. For commen-

tary on the international aspects of tax integration, see, e.g., Hugh J. Ault, Corporate Integration,
Tax Treaties and the Division of the InternationalTax Base: Principlesand Practices, 47 TAX L.
REv. 565 (1992).
48. The adopted integration systems vary significantly. For example, imputation credit systems
have been included in the tax integration structures of such nations as Australia, New Zealand,
France, and Germany. Germany also applies a split tax rate, differentiating between the tax payable
on distributed as opposed to retained corporate earnings. Other nations, such as Canada, have adopted

straight dividend credits. See

TREASURY INTEGRATION REPORT,

supra note 1, at 159-84.

49. A distinguished early study is William D. Andrews, Out of Its Earnings and Profits: Some
Reflections on the Taxation of Dividends, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1403 (1956). Among recent articles
are William D. Andrews, Tax Neutrality Between Equity Capital and Debt, 30 WAYNE L. REV.
1057 (1984), and Alvin C. Warren, The Relation andIntegrationof Individualand CorporateIncome
Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REv. 719 (1981). A Colloquium on Corporate Integration was sponsored by
the Tax Law Review in 1992, the papers of which are collected in 47 TAX L. REv. 427-723 (1992).

50. See TREASURY

INTEGRATION REPORT,

supra note 1, at viii; see also Treasury Department,

A Recommendation for Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems (1992), reprinted
in Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Dec. 14, 1992, at L-7.
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to be taxed fully at the corporate level, but for dividends to be excluded from the
taxable income of the shareholders who receive them. The Treasury's proposed
comprehensive business income tax extends a similar rule to corporate interest
payments, denying them as deductions to the corporation but excluding them
from income by the recipients.51 In each of these models, the tax paid on corporate
income is, therefore, at the corporate income tax rate.
By contrast, the American Law Institute (ALI) has proposed a complex imputation credit system, providing shareholders with a refundable credit for taxes paid
by the distributing corporation. 52 Under this structure the corporation would pay
a dividend withholding tax at the highest individual tax rate, and each shareholder
receiving a dividend would be entitled to a tax refund credit equal to the excess
of the amount withheld over the actual tax the shareholder would pay on the
dividend received.53 Under this system, the tax paid on corporate income is,
therefore, at the individual tax rate of each shareholder.
Not all tax integration models will approximate the same tax effects for corporations and partnerships, and none are likely to produce identical tax effects for
the two forms of enterprise. Some, but not all, integration approaches mitigate
the tax differences between debt and equity. To illustrate these points, the tax
planning issues involved in choice of enterprise form and structure are analyzed
below under the basic integration models proposed by the Treasury Department
and the ALT.
B.

THE CHOICE OF PARTNERSHIP OR CORPORATE FoRM
UNDER THE INTEGRATION PROPOSALS

The Treasury and ALI proposals would mitigate in varying degrees the sharp
differences between partnership and corporate income taxation in the United
States. Both would basically tax corporate income only once. Moreover, the ALI
proposal would achieve taxation of corporate income at the same individual rates
as taxation of partnership income. However, the Treasury proposal would retain
taxation of corporate income at corporate rates, thereby retaining an incentive
to use the partnership form whenever investors in the enterprise have lower
marginal tax rates than the corporate tax rate.
Both proposals leave intact many of the existing tax incentives for use of

51. See TREASURY INTEGRATION REPORT, supra note 1, at 17, 40. In the Treasury proposals,
as well as in any enacted implementation structure, these basic rules must be implemented by detailed
provisions covering such matters as tax-exempt and foreign investors, tax preferences, corporate
shareholders, and tax abuse.
52. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, TAX ADVISORY GROUP

DRAFT No. 21, REPORTER'S STUDY (1992) [hereinafter ALl REPORTER'S STUDY]. For analysis of
the planning implications of these proposals, see Michael L. Schler, Taxing CorporateIncome Once
(orHopefully Not at All): A Practitioner'sComparison of the Treasury and ALl IntegrationModels,
47 TAX L. REV. 509 (1992).
53. See ALI REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 52, at 79-87.
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the partnership. Neither proposal gives a corporate shareholder certain of the
important tax benefits of being a partner, including pass-through of enterprise
losses, pass-through of the tax character of the enterprise income, and nonrecognition of gain on the distribution of appreciated assets.M
C. DEBT AND EQUITY FINANCING UNDER THE
INTEGRATION PROPOSALS

The Treasury dividend exclusion proposal appears on its face to continue the
corporation's incentive to issue debt rather than equity, since interest would
remain deductible and dividends would remain nondeductible by the corporation.
However, the exclusion of dividends would increase the net return to shareholders, and the corporation should therefore be able to raise equity capital at a lower
net cost. The calculations in the illustration in part H.B, above, would change.
Given a market dividend rate on the corporation's preferred stock, prior to integration by dividend exclusion, of 10 percent, the corporation should be able to issue
the same stock with a post-integration dividend rate of approximately 6 percent. 5
If the same corporation pays approximately 8 percent annual interest on its medium or long-term bonds and if the interest remains deductible, the taxes of the
corporation will be reduced by 35 percent of the interest payment, or 2.8 percent.
As a result, the true interest cost, in both expense and cash flow, will be 5.2
percent. Although the cost of debt likely remains lower than the cost of equity,
the difference is reduced by the Treasury's dividend exclusion proposal.
The tax incentive to issue debt rather than equity would on its face be eliminated
by the long-range Treasury proposal of a comprehensive business income tax in
which both dividends and interest would be nondeductible by the corporation
and excluded from income by the recipients. But the problems raised by this
proposal are considerable and are not subject to easy solution. Among the most
noteworthy problems would be the creation of a new corporate incentive to switch
from nondeductible debt financing to financing in the form of leases, resulting
in deductible rent or royalty payments. 6 The ALI proposal, which in effect would
tax all dividends and interest equivalently, but based on the tax rate of the investor,
also poses special problems. The ALI proposal to tax all interest income contemplates the possibility of taxing even the interest income of tax-exempt investors. 57
54. These issues are analyzed in Schler, supra note 52, at 509, 522-24, 527-29.
55. Prior to integration, a maximum tax-bracket individual shareholder receiving a 10% dividend
would pay federal income tax thereon at the rate of 39.6%, leaving a net after-tax return of slightly
more than 6%. For the same investor, therefore, an excludible dividend of 6% would represent an
equivalent investment return. This calculation, apart from its simplified arithmetic, does not take
into account a series of economic factors that might alter the relative market returns of stock in a
post-integration setting. These factors include variations in the marginal tax rates of investors, investment practices of taxable and nontaxable investors, and the implications of likely unavailability of
the dividend exclusion to foreign investors.
56. See TREASURY INTEGRATION REPORT, supra note 1, at 53-54.
57. See ALl REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 52, at 138-39.
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IV. Conclusion
This article has described some of the major corporate tax planning opportunities created by the classical system of double taxation of corporate income in
the United States. These opportunities include tax-motivated choice of enterprise
form and tax-motivated choice of methods of raising capital. While the economic
implications of tax-motivated choice of form are important, the tax incentives
to issue debt in preference to equity may be of even greater consequence, affecting
the financial stability of many enterprises.
Although these incentives may be reduced under certain integration proposals
in the United States as well as certain integration structures adopted in other
nations of the world, they will probably not be eliminated. The complex provisions
required in the actual implementation of a workable tax integration plan will
continue to offer opportunities to reduce taxes by altering enterprise form and
structure.
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